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Abstract
The paper is concerned with two-person games with saddle point. We investigate the
limits of value functions for long-time-average payoff, discounted average payoff, and the
payoff that follows a probability density.
We provide two results. The first one is a uniform Tauber result for games: if the
value functions for long-time-average payoff converge uniformly, then there exists the
uniform limit for probability densities from a sufficiently broad set; moreover, these limits
coincide. The second one is the uniform Abel result: if a uniform limit for self-similar
densities exists, then the uniform limit for long-time average payoff also exists, and they
coincide.
For bounded sequences, Hardy proved that the convergence of their Cesaro means is equiv-
alent to the convergence of their Abel means. This result has been generalized by Feller to the
case of uncontrolled deterministic dynamics in continuous time; [12] to deterministic controlled
dynamics with dependence on the initial data: if there exists a uniform limit of values for one
of the payoffs
1
T
∫ T
0
g
(
z(t)
)
dt (Cesaro mean), λ
∫ ∞
0
e−λtg
(
z(t)
)
dt (Abel mean),
then the other exists too and they are equal.
Many papers are devoted to the subject of existence of limits of such values; let us first of
all note [2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 15]; see also the reviews in [12, 16]. As proved in [10], for a stochastic
two-person game with a finite number of states and actions, optimal long-time averages and
optimal discounted averages share the common limit; for repeat games, see [6]. For differential
games, the limits exist in special cases (first of all, in the nonexpansive-like case); [1, 4, 7].
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1
The general result that mirrors the result from [12] for dynamic games (including differential
games) was proved in [9].
In addition to the functions 1
T
1[0,T ], λe
−λt , one could consider arbitrary probability den-
sities, and then the asymptotic behavior of the value functions for the following games. For
discrete time systems, [14] expresses the conditions of existence of a uniform limit that is shared
by all probability distributions. In [11], it was noted that if a probability density is nonincreas-
ing, the payoff can be expressed as a convex combination of the Cesaro means. Consequently,
that paper proved that, for discrete time systems, there exists a uniform limit for such distribu-
tions and it coincides with the limit of the long-run-average if the latter exists and is uniform.
A similar approach was used in [6] for repeat games.
In this paper, we show uniform Tauberian theorems for dynamic two-person games with
saddle points. Most of our assumptions restrict the dynamics of games. In particular, like
in [12], we assume the closedness of strategies under concatenation. It is also necessary for
the value function to satisfy Bellman’s optimality principle, even if in a weakened, asymptotic
sense.
We provide two results. The first one is a uniform Tauber result for games with saddle point:
the uniform convergence of value functions for long-time average payoff implies the existence of
a uniform limit of value functions for all probability densities from a sufficiently broad set (of
bounded variation type); moreover, these limits coincide. The second one is the uniform Abel
result for the games with saddle point: the existence of a uniform limit of value functions with
self-similar probability densities implies the existence of a uniform limit of value functions for
long-time-average payoff, and these limits coincide.
The similar results for 1
T
1[0,T ], λe
−λt were proved in [9]. Although our proofs follow [9], we
use a weaker modification of Bellman’s optimality principle. This allows us to generalize the
results of [12] in this article.
1 General framework of dynamic system
Assume the following items are given:
• a set Ω of states;
• a set K of feasible processes, which is a subset of mappings from R≥0 to Ω ;
• a running cost g : Ω 7→ [0, 1]; for each process z ∈ K, assume the map t 7→ g
(
z(t)
)
is
Borel-measurable.
For each ω ∈ Ω , define Γ(ω)
△
= {z ∈ K | z(0) ∈ Ω}, the set of all feasible processes z ∈ K
starting from ω .
Let us now define the operation of concatenation on processes. Let τ ∈ R≥0, z
′, z′′ ∈ K be
such that z′(τ) = z′′(0). Then, their concatenation z′ ⋄τ z
′′ is defined by the following rule:
(z′ ⋄τ z
′′)(t)
△
=
{
z′(t), t < τ ;
z′′(t− τ), t ≥ τ.
Call a subset A of the set K a playable strategy if, for every initial position ω ∈ Ω , we
have A ∩ Γ(ω) 6= ∅.
Now, for each two playable strategies A′, A′′ and a time τ ∈ R≥0 , define concatenation by
A′ ⋄τ A
′′ △=
{
z′ ⋄τ z
′′ | z′ ∈ A′, z′′ ∈ A′′, z′(τ) = z′′(0)
}
.
Hereinafter set A ⋄τ ′ A
′ ⋄τ ′′ A
′′ △=
(
A ⋄τ ′ A
′
)
⋄τ ′′ A
′′.
Define the following axioms for some family A of subsets K :
(p) A is some family of playable strategies;
(ω) A allows the separation of ω (at the initial time): for each mapping ξ : Ω→ A
∃A ∈ A ∀ω ∈ Ω ξ(ω) ∩ Γ(ω) = A ∩ Γ(ω);
(⋄) A is closed under concatenation ⋄ : ∀τ > 0, A′, A′′ ∈ A A′ ⋄τ A
′′ ∈ A.
2 Formalization of lower and upper games
Consider a two-player game. The first player wishes to maximize a bounded payoff function
c : K → R ; the second player wishes to minimize it. The first player also has his family A of
playable strategies specified.
The game is conducted in the following way: for a given ω ∈ Ω, the first player demonstrates
some set A in A , and then the second player chooses a process z ∈ A∩Γ(ω) ; we have a conflict:
A ∈ A ⇑ c(z) ⇓ z ∈ A ∩ Γ(ω).
The value function of the lower game is
V
♭[c](ω)
△
= sup
A∈A
inf
z∈A∩Γ(ω)
c(z) ∀ω ∈ Ω.
Note that, for every playable strategy A , A ∩ Γ(ω) 6= ∅, c is bounded; therefore, the value
for the lower game is valid.
For the upper game, we still have two players, the first player maximizes the payoff c ,
whereas the second player minimizes it. Let the second player also have a family B of playable
strategies.
The upper game is conducted in the following way. Given ω ∈ Ω, let the second demonstrate
some set B in B ; then, let the second player choose some process z ∈ B ∩ Γ(ω) . The value
function of the upper game is
V
♯[c](ω)
△
= inf
B∈B
sup
z∈B∩Γ(ω)
c(z) ∀ω ∈ Ω.
Thanks to the boundedness of c and playable strategies in B , this function is valid as well.
Remember that a game with the payoff function c has a saddle point if V ♭[c] = V ♯[c]. We
would also require a slightly weaker definition.
Definition 1 Assign a bounded function cλ : K → R to every positive λ . Let us say that
a game family with the payoff functions cλ has an asymptotic saddle point if the limit of∣∣V ♭[cλ](ω)− V ♯[cλ](ω)∣∣ as λ ↓ 0 exists, is equal to 0 , and is uniform for ω ∈ Ω .
We hereinafter impose the following axiom on the families A,B :
(s) A ∩B ∩ Γ(ω) 6= ∅ for any A ∈ A, B ∈ B, ω ∈ Ω .
The utility of conditions (s), (ω) is clarified by the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Suppose A,B satisfy conditions (p), (ω) . Assume K is equipped with a topology
such that some bounded mapping c : K→ R is continuous. In addition, let cl A∩cl B∩Γ(ω) 6=
∅ for all ω ∈ Ω, A ∈ A, B ∈ B. Then, for all ε > 0 , there exist Aε ∈ A, Bε ∈ B such that,
for all ω ∈ Ω ,
V
♭[c](ω)− ε < inf
z∈Aε∩Γ(ω)
c(z) ≤ sup
z∈Bε∩Γ(ω)
c(z) < V ♯[c](ω) + ε;
V
♭[c](ω) ≤ V ♯[c](ω). (1)
In particular, these inequalities hold if A,B satisfy conditions (p), (ω), (s) .
Proof. Consider arbitrary ω ∈ Ω, ε > 0; there exist maps ξε : Ω → A , ζε : Ω → A such
that, for the payoff c under initial condition z(0) = ω, the strategy ξε(ω) is ε -optimal in the
lower game (the strategy ζε(ω) in the upper game). Then, by the property of (ω) , there exist
strategies Aε ∈ A ,Bε ∈ B for which ξε(ω)∩Γ(ω) = Aε ∩Γ(ω) , ζε(ω)∩Γ(ω) = Bε ∩Γ(ω) for
any ω ∈ Ω . Choose a common trajectory zε(ω) ∈ cl Aε ∩ cl Bε ∩ Γ(ω).
Since c is continuous,
V
♭[c](ω)− ε < inf
z∈clξε(ω)∩Γ(ω)
c(z) = inf
z∈Aε∩Γ(ω)
c(z) ≤ c
(
zε(ω)
)
for all ω ∈ Ω . The converse inequality is proved for V ♯[c], Bε in a similar way. Now, since the
choice of ε was arbitrary, these inequalities imply ( 1 ) .
If we know that it is always A∩B ∩ Γ(ω) 6= ∅ , then, because c would be continuous were
K equipped with the discrete topology, the proof is complete. 
3 On probability densities
Consider a summable Borel-measurable function ̺ in B(R≥0,R≥0). Assign to it a payoff func-
tion [̺] : K→ [0, 1] by the following rule:
[̺](z)
△
=
∫ ∞
0
̺(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt ∀z ∈ K.
Note that every [̺] is bounded by the number ||̺||L1(R≥0,R≥0). Therefore, the following defi-
nitions are valid for all ω ∈ Ω :
V
♭[̺](ω)
△
= V ♭
[
[̺]
]
(ω) = sup
A∈A
inf
z∈A∩Γ(ω)
∫ ∞
0
̺(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt ∈ R,
V
♯[̺](ω)
△
= V ♯
[
[̺]
]
(ω) = inf
B∈B
sup
z∈B∩Γ(ω)
∫ ∞
0
̺(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt ∈ R.
Recall that a Borel-measurable mapping ̺ : R≥0 → R≥0 is called a probability density function
if
lim
T→∞
∫ T
0
̺(t) dt = 1.
For every density ̺ and number r ∈ (0, 1) there exists the quantile q[̺](r) , i.e., the minimum
number such that ∫ q[̺](r)
0
̺(t) dt = r.
Naturally, in this case, “a game family with densities ̺λ has an asymptotic saddle point”
means that the game family with the payoffs function [̺λ] has an asymptotic saddle point.
In what follows, for every interval [a, b) ⊂ R and function f : [a, b)→ R∪{∞} , denote by
V arba[f ] the total variation of the function f in [a, b) . Consider the following definition:
Definition 2 We say that the family of densities ̺λ (λ > 0 ) is flat at zero if
lim
r→0
lim
λ↓0
V ar
q[̺λ](r)
0 [ln ̺λ] = 0. (2)
Definition 3 We say that the family of densities ̺λ (λ > 0 ) is regular if, for each r ∈ (0, 1) ,
the following upper limit is bounded:
lim sup
λ↓0
V ar
q[̺λ](r)
0 [ln ̺λ] ∈ R. (3)
Define, for every λ > 0 , the probability densities ̟λ, πλ by the rule
̟λ
△
= λ1[0,1/λ], πλ
△
= λe−λt.
For all r ∈ (0, 1), λ > 0 , we have
V ar
q[̟λ](r)
0 [ln̟λ] = 0, V ar
q[πλ](r)
0 [ln πλ] = − ln(1− r).
Thus, the families (̟λ)λ>0 and (πλ)λ>0 are flat at zero and regular.
For every density ̺ and parameter r ∈ (0, 1) , define the function ̺|r〉 : R≥0 → R≥0 by the
rule
̺|r〉(t) = ̺
(
t+ q[̺](r)
)
∀t ≥ 0.
Let us also define the payoff |r〉[̺] : K → R for every λ > 0, r ∈ (0, 1) by the following rule:
for all z ∈ K ,

|r〉[̺](z)
△
=
∫ q[̺](r)
0
̺(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt+ V ♯
[
̺|r〉
](
z
(
q[̺](r)
))
.
Now, for every r ∈ (0, 1), λ > 0 , we have
̟
|r〉
λ = (1− r)̟ λ
1−r
, π
|r〉
λ = (1− r)πλ.
Definition 4 The family of densities ̺λ is self-similar if, for each positive r ∈ (0, 1), λ , there
exists a positive h(λ, r), ν(λ, r) such that
̺
|r〉
λ = h(λ, r)̺ν(λ,r). (4)
Note that there are quite many such self-similar families. For example, for every Borel-
measurable function f : R → R>0 , one can define its self-similar family of densities ̺λ (λ > 0)
by the following rule:
̺1/T (t) =
f(T − t)1[0,T ](t)∫ T
0
f(T − τ) dτ
∀T, t > 0.
In view of the definitions of q[̺λ](r), ̺
|r〉
λ , condition ( 4 ) implies
1− r =
∫ ∞
0
̺
|r〉
λ (t)dt =
∫ ∞
0
h(λ, r)̺ν(λ,r)(t)dt = h(λ, r),
̺
|r〉
λ = (1− r)̺ν(λ,r). (5)
Assume ρλ(0) = λ for all λ > 0 . Then, for each r ∈ (0, 1) ,
(1− r)ν(λ, r) = h(λ, r)̺ν(λ,r)(0) = ̺λ
(
q[̺λ](r)
)
.
Thus,
lim
λ↓0
ν(λ, r) = 0 ∀r ∈ (0, 1) (6)
if and only if ̺λ
(
q[̺λ](r)
)
→ 0 as λ ↓ 0 for any r ∈ (0, 1).
On other side, for every r ∈ (0, 1), λ > 0 ,
ln ̺λ
(
q[̺λ](r)
)
≤ ln ̺λ(0) + V ar
q[̺λ](r)
0 [ln ̺λ].
R e m a r k 1 If the self-similar family of ̺λ is regular, and ̺λ(0) = λ for all λ > 0 , then
( 6 ) holds.
4 Main result.
Theorem 1 Assume A,B satisfy conditions (p), (⋄), (ω), (s).
Consider a self-similar family of densities ̺λ (λ > 0) such that
1. every function ̺λ satisfies ̺λ(0) = λ ; moreover, the family is flat at zero;
2. the family satisfies ( 6 ) ; for example, the family is regular;
3. for sufficiently small r , the family of games with payoffs |r〉[̺λ] (λ > 0) has an asymp-
totic saddle point;
4. a game family with the probability densities ̺λ (λ > 0) has an asymptotic saddle point,
and there exists a common limit V∗ for V
♭[̺λ] and V
♯[̺λ] that is uniform in ω ∈ Ω .
Then, the game family with probability densities ̟µ = µ1[0,1/µ] (µ > 0 ) has an asymptotic
saddle point, and the common limit of values V ♯[̟µ] and V
♯[̟µ] also exists, is uniform in
ω ∈ Ω , and coincides with V∗.
Theorem 2 Assume A,B satisfy axioms (p), (⋄), (ω), (s).
Let a regular family of densities ςµ (µ > 0) satisfy
lim
µ→0
∫ T
0
ςµ(t) dt = 0 ∀T > 0. (7)
For the family with probability densities ̟λ = λ1[0,1/λ] (λ > 0) assume:
1. under sufficiently small r , the game family with the payoffs |r〉[̟λ] (λ > 0) has an
asymptotic saddle point;
2. a game family with probability densities ̟λ has an asymptotic saddle point, and there
exists a common limit V∗ for V
♭[̟λ] and V
♯[̟λ] that is uniform in ω ∈ Ω .
Then, a game family with probability densities ςµ has an asymptotic saddle point, the com-
mon limit of payoffs V ♯[ςµ] and V
♯[ςµ] also exists, is uniform in ω ∈ Ω , and coincides with V∗.
Corollary 1 Assume A,B satisfy conditions (p), (ω), (⋄), (s).
Let a game family with payoffs |r〉[̺λ] (λ > 0) have an asymptotic saddle point for every
family of densities ςλ and all r ∈ (0, 1) .
Then, the following conditions on the function V∗ : Ω→ [0, 1] are equivalent:
• for a certain regular self-similar family of densities ̺λ with ̺λ(0) = λ that is flat at
zero and satisfies ( 7 ) , there exists the common limit
lim
λ↓0
V
♯[̺λ](ω) = lim
λ↓0
V
♭[̺λ](ω) = V∗(ω); (8)
that is uniform for ω ∈ Ω;
• for a family of densities ̺λ = λ1[0,1/λ] , there exists the common limit of ( 8 ) that is
uniform for ω ∈ Ω;
• for a family of densities ̺λ = λe
−λt , there exists the common limit of ( 8 ) that is
uniform for ω ∈ Ω;
• for every regular family of densities ̺λ (λ > 0) with ( 7 ) , there exists the common limit
of ( 8 ) that is uniform for ω ∈ Ω.
Note that the existence of an asymptotic saddle point for a family of games with the pay-
offs |r〉[̺λ] (λ > 0) can be demonstrated in different ways. For example, under conditions
(p), (ω), (⋄), (s) , it is sufficient to prove that for every T > 0 , any A ∈ A, B ∈ B can be
expressed in the form A = A ⋄τ A
′ , B = B ⋄τ B
′ for certain A′ ∈ A, B′ ∈ B (see [9]).
In some cases, not even that is necessary.
Case of one-person games.
Let us consider the example in the form of deterministic dynamic programming problem
in continuous time. As in [12], assume the sets Ω,K to be given; moreover, assume K to be
closed under concatenation.
Consider an arbitrary bounded payoff function c : K→ R. Set A
△
= {K} . Now,
V
♭[c](ω) = sup
A∈{K}
inf
z∈A∩Γ(ω)
c(z) = inf
z∈Γ(ω)
c(z) ∀ω ∈ Ω.
Consider all the possible selectors ζ of the multivalued mapping Ω ∋ ω 7→ Γ(ω) ⊂ K; let B be
the set of all possible images ζ(Ω) of these mappings. Since K is closed under concatenation,
condition (⋄) holds for A and B defined in such way. Conditions (p), (ω), (s) can be verified
directly. Now, Lemma 1 implies that
V
♯[c](ω) = sup
B∈B
inf
z∈B∩Γ(ω)
c(z) = inf
z∈Γ(ω)
c(z) ∀ω ∈ Ω.
Thus, a game with arbitrary bounded payoff c has a saddle point. Finally,
R e m a r k 2 For a one-person game under conditions of [12], result of Corollary 1 holds.
In particular, the condition of uniformity for the limit of ( 8 ) is in the general case indispensable
for the results above; for the counterexample, refer to [12].
5 Proof of Theorems 1,2.
5.1 Auxiliary statements.
R e m a r k 3 Under conditions of Theorem 1, in view of ( 4 ) , ( 5 ) , for all z ∈ K ,

|r〉[̺λ](z) coincides with∫ q[̺λ](r)
0
̺λ(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt+ (1− r)V ♯
[
̺ν(λ,r)
](
z(q[̺λ](r))
)
;
moreover, by ( 6 ) , the family of games with payoffs∫ q[̺λ](r)
0
̺λ(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt+ (1− r)V ♭
[
̺ν(λ,r)
](
z(q[̺λ](r))
)
has an asymptotic saddle point for sufficiently small positive r.
Lemma 2 Assume all conditions of Theorem 1 hold. Then, for all sufficiently small r ∈ (0, 1) ,
there exist the limits
lim
λ↓0
V
♭[|r〉[̺λ]](ω) = lim
λ↓0
V
♯[|r〉[̺λ]](ω) = V
∗(ω),
and these limits are uniform for ω ∈ Ω.
Proof. By the condition, the family of games with the payoffs |r〉[̺λ] has an asymptotic
saddle point for all sufficiently small r ∈ (0, 1) . Fix one such r ∈ (0, 1).
Let us show that, for all positive ε < 1 , V ♯[|r〉[̺λ]] ≥ V∗ − ε for sufficiently small λ > 0 .
Suppose it is not; then, there exists a positive δ > 0 such that, for every natural n , there exist
a positive λn < 1/n and ωn ∈ Ω such that V
♯[|r〉[̺λn ]](ωn) < V∗(ωn)− 8δ. Fix that δ < 1/8 .
But, there exists a natural n such that
V
♯[̺ν(λn,r)] < V∗ + δ, V
♭[̺λn ] > V∗ − δ.
Fix such n, λn, ωn .
Now, there exists A ∈ A such that we obtain
V∗(z(0))− 2δ < V
♭
[
̺λn
](
z(0)
)
− δ <
∫ ∞
0
̺λn(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt ∀z ∈ A; (9)
there exists B′′ ∈ B such that, for all z ∈ B′′ , we obtain
V
♯
[
̺ν(λn,r)
](
z(0)
)
+ δ >
∫ ∞
0
̺ν(λn,r)(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt
(5)
=
1
1− r
∫ ∞
0
̺
|r〉
λn
(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt. (10)
By definition of δ , there exists B′ ∈ B such that, for all z ∈ B′ ∩ Γ(ωn) , we have

|r〉[̺λn ](z) < V
♯[|r〉[̺λn ]](ωn) + δ < V∗(ωn)− 7δ. (11)
Set T
△
= q[̺λn ](r); since the left-hand side of this inequality depends only on z|[0,T ], the
strategy B′ can be substituted here with strategy B′ ⋄T B
′′.
Then, for any z ∈ A ∩ (B′ ⋄T B
′′) ∩ Γ(ωn),
V∗(ωn)− 2δ
(9)
≤
∫ ∞
0
̺λn(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt
=
∫ T
0
̺λn(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt+
∫ ∞
T
̺
|r〉
λn
(t− T )g
(
z(t)
)
dt
(10)
≤ |r〉[̺λn ](z) + δ
(11)
≤ V∗(ωn)− 6δ.
The obtained contradiction proves that V ♯[|r〉[̺λ]] ≥ V∗− ε for any ε > 0 and sufficiently
small λ > 0 . The inequality V ♭[|r〉[̺λ]] ≤ V∗ + ε , in view of Remark 3, is proved similarly. It
remains to note that, by the condition, V ♯[|r〉[̺λ]](ω)−V
♭[|r〉[̺λ]](ω)→ 0 as λ ↓ 0 , and this
limit is uniform in ω ∈ Ω. 
5.2 Proof of Theorem 1.
In Section 6, we proved the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Let all conditions of Theorem 1 hold. Then, for all positive ε , there exists
µ¯ > 0 such that, for all positive µ < µ¯ for all ω ∈ Ω , we have V ♭[̟µ](ω) > V∗(ω)− 6ε.
Define a function g−
△
= 1 − g. It is easy to see that, for a probability density ̺ , relation
g + g− ≡ 1 implies that, for all ω ∈ Ω ,
1− V ♯[̺](ω) = inf
B∈B
sup
z∈B
∫ ∞
0
̺(t)g−
(
z(t)
)
dt.
Conditions of Proposition 1 hold for the lower game with the probability density ̟µ, running
cost g− , the limit value 1−V∗ , and swapped capabilities of players B,A . Then, for all positive
ε for sufficiently small µ > 0 , we have 1 − V ♯[̟µ] > 1 − V∗ − 6ε. Now, in view of Lemma 1,
we have V ♭[̟µ] ≤ V
♯[̟µ] < V∗ + 6ε. As proved above, for sufficiently small positive µ , we
have V∗ − 6ε < V
♭[̟µ]. Since the positive ε was chosen arbitrarily, V
♭[̟µ] and V
♯[̟µ] have
the common limit (as µ→ 0 ); this limit equals V∗ and is uniform in ω ∈ Ω. 
5.3 Proof of Theorem 2.
Note that the family of ̟λ satisfies all conditions of Theorem 1. Then, Lemma 2 and Remark 3
hold for it.
In Section 7, we proved the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Let all conditions of Theorem 2 hold. Then, for all positive ε , there exists
µ¯ > 0 such that, for all positive µ < µ¯ for all ω ∈ Ω , we have V ♭[ςµ](ω) > V∗(ω)− 6ε.
Now, a literal repetition of the proof of Theorem 1 with ̟µ replaced with ςµ and ̺λ
replaced with ̟λ provides what was required. 
6 Proof of Proposition 1.
According to the condition of Theorem 1 and the result of Lemma 2, for all positive κ , for all
r ∈ (0, 1) , there exists a positive λˆ(κ, r) such that, for all positive λ ≤ λˆ(κ, r) ,
V∗ − V
♭
[

|r〉[̺λ]
]
< κ, V ♭[̺λ]− V∗ < κ.
Let us show that, for all positive ε < 1/4 , there exists µ¯ > 0 such that, for all positive
µ < µ¯ , we have V ♭[̟µ] > V∗ − 4ε. Fix a positive ε < 1/4.
By ( 2 ) , for some rˇ ∈ (0, 1) , every positive r < rˇ has a positive λˇ(r) such that, for a
positive λ < λˇ(r) ,
V ar
q[̺λ](r)
0
[
ln ̺λ
]
<
ε
2
;
now, for all nonnegative t ≤ q[̺λ](r) ,
̺λ(t) ≤ e
ε/2̺λ(0) = e
ε/2λ < (1 + ε)λ,∫ τ
0
|̺λ(t)− λ| dt ≤ ελτ (12)
as soon as λ < λˇ(r) , τ ≤ q[̺λ](r), r < rˇ for some positive rˇ. Fix a positive rˇ.
There exists a natural k > 2/ε > 4 such that ln k
k
< rˇ . Fix k . Set
p
△
= k−1/k, κ
△
=
1
3k2
.
By the condition,
pk =
1
k
, 1− p < − ln p =
ln k
k
< rˇ. (13)
From ( 6 ) , we know that there exists a positive λ¯(k) such that, for positive λ < λ¯(k) , we
have λ, ν(λ, 1− p) < λˆ(κ, 1− p) . Assume µ¯ = min
(
λ¯(k), λˇ(1− p)
)
/k. Fix µ < µ¯.
Set τ0
△
= 0 ; for each m = 1, 2 . . . , k , set
λm
△
=
µpm−1
1 + ε
, tm
△
= q[̺λm ](1− p), τm
△
= τm−1 + tm.
Now, in accordance with ( 13 ) , we have λm < kµ ≤ kµ¯ ≤ λ¯(k) ; hence, λm, ν(λm, 1 − p) <
λˆ(κ, 1− p) , i.e.,
V∗ − V
♭[|1−p〉[̺λ]] < κ, (14)
V
♭[̺ν(λm,1−p)]− V∗ < κ. (15)
Moreover, by ( 13 ) , 1 − p < rˇ , λm < kµ¯ ≤ λˇ(1 − p) and tm = q[λm](1 − p) , we have ( 12 ) ,
i.e., ∫ tm
0
|̺λm(t)− λm| dt ≤ ελmtm. (16)
Now, for all z ∈ K ,
∫ tm
0
̺λm(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt
(16)
≤ (1 + ε)
∫ tm
0
λmg
(
z(t)
)
dt
= µpm−1
∫ tm
0
g
(
z(t)
)
dt; (17)
moreover, using ε < 1/4, tm = q[̺λm ](1− p) we obtain
tmµp
m−1 = tmλm(1 + ε)
(16)
≤
1 + ε
1− ε
∫ tm
0
̺λm(t) dt =
(1− p)(1 + ε)
1− ε
< (1− p)(1 + 3ε).
Thus, we have τkµ ≤ (1− p)(1 + 3ε)
(
1 + · · ·+ pk−1
)
< 1 + 3ε, and
µ1[0,τk] ≤ ̟µ + µ1(1/µ,(1+3ε)/µ]. (18)
By ( 14 ) , V∗ − κ does not exceed the lower value V
♭[|1−p〉[̺λm ]] of the game with the
payoff |1−p〉[̺λm ], i.e., with the payoff∫ tm
0
̺λm(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt+ pV ♭[̺ν(λm,1−p)]
(
z(tm)
)
.
In view of ( 15 ) this, in its own turn, does not exceed the lower value of the game with the
payoff ∫ tm
0
̺λm(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt + pV∗
(
z(tm)
)
+ κ.
By Lemma 1, this game has a κ -optimal strategy Am ∈ A ; then, for all z ∈ Am , V∗
(
z(0)
)
does not exceed∫ tm
0
̺λm(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt+ pV∗
(
z(tm)
)
+ 3κ
(17)
≤ pm−1
∫ tm
0
µg
(
z(t)
)
dt+ pV∗
(
z(tm)
)
+ 3κ.
Since the right-hand sides of these inequalities depend only on z|[0,tm], the strategy A
m can
be substituted here with any strategy that may be represented in the form Am ⋄tm A
′′. Now,
for all m = 1, . . . , k, A′, A′′ ∈ A, z ∈ A′ ⋄τm−1 A
m ⋄τm A
′′ , we obtain
V∗
(
z(τm−1)
)
≤ pm−1
∫ τm
τm−1
µg
(
z(t)
)
dt+ pV∗
(
z(τm)
)
+ 3κ. (19)
Set A∗
△
= A1 ⋄τ1 A
2 ⋄τ2 · · · ⋄τk−1 A
k. For every z ∈ A∗ , ( 19 ) holds for all m = 1, . . . , k.
Now, taking at first m = 1 , and subsequently using ( 19 ) for m = 2, 3 . . . , k , we have
V∗
(
z(0)
) (19)
≤
∫ τ1
0
µg
(
z(t)
)
dt+ pV∗
(
z(τ1)
)
+ 3κ
(19)
≤
∫ τ2
0
µg
(
z(t)
)
dt+ p2V∗
(
z(τ2)
)
+ 6κ
(19)
≤ . . .
(19)
≤
∫ τk
0
µg
(
z(t)
)
dt+ pkV∗
(
z(τk)
)
+ 3kκ
(13)
≤
∫ τk
0
µg
(
z(t)
)
dt+
2
k
.
But then, V∗ ≤ µV
♭[1[0,τk]] +
2
k
as well. Now, by ( 18 ) , we have
µV ♭[1[0,τk]] ≤ V
♭[̟µ] + 3ε,
V∗ ≤ V
♭[̟µ] + 3ε+
2
k
.
Since by the choice of k we have εk > 2 , we obtain V∗ ≤ V
♭[̟µ] + 4ε for all µ < µ¯, which
was to be proved. 
7 Proof of Proposition 2.
Let us show that, for every positive ε < 1 , there exist µ¯ > 0 such that, for all positive µ < µ¯
for all ω ∈ Ω , we have
V
♭[ςµ](ω) > V∗(ω)− 6ε.
Fix a positive ε < 1.
For every positive µ , define T (µ)
△
= q[ςµ](1 − ε) by
∫ T (µ)
0
ςµ(t) dt = 1 − ε. By ( 3 ) , there
also exist positive M, µ˘ such that
V ar
T (µ)
0 [ln ςµ] dt < M
for µ < µ˘ . Fix M, µ˘.
Since, for all t ∈
[
0, T (µ)
]
, we have ςµ(0) ≤ e
M ςµ(t), integrating over this interval, we
obtain ςµ(0) < e
M/T (µ) . Then, ςµ(t) < e
2M/T (µ). Thanks to ( 7 ) , we have T (µ) → ∞ as
µ ↓ 0 . Thus, for every positive λ , there exists a positive µˆ(λ) < µ˘, such that, for positive
µ < µˆ(λ) , we obtain ςµ(t) < λ for all t ∈
[
0, T (µ)
]
.
There exists a natural k > M such that eM/k < 1+ε, kε > − ln ε. Then, k(1−ε1/k
2
) < ε.
Fix such k .
Set
κ
△
=
ε
3k2
, p
△
= ε1/k
2
, δ
△
= 1− p <
ε
k
. (20)
Then, δ + pδ + · · ·+ pk
2−1δ = 1− ε, δ + pδ + p2δ + · · · = 1.
According to the condition of Theorem 2 and the result of Lemma 2, for a certain positive
λˆ(k) for all positive λ < ελˆ(k) , we have
V
♭[̟λ]− V∗ < κ, V∗ − V
♭
[

|1−p〉[̟λ]
]
< κ. (21)
Then, by definition of µˆ , for some positive µ¯ < µˆ
(
ελˆ(k)
)
, we also have ςµ(t) < ελˆ(k) for
all t ∈
[
0, T (µ)
]
, µ < µ¯ . Fix such µ > 0 .
Note that T (µ) = q[ςµ](1− p
k2). Let us partition the interval
[
0, T (µ)
]
=
[
0, q[ςµ](1− p
k2)
]
into k2 nonempty intervals [τm, τm+1) (m = 1, . . . , k
2 ); to this end, define
τ0 = 0, τm = q[ςµ](1− p
m), λm
△
=
∫ τm
τm−1
ςµ(t) dt
τm − τm−1
=
pm−1 − pm
τm − τm−1
.
Note that the choice of µ implies that λm < ελˆ(k) for all m = 1, . . . , k
2 . Then, for all
m = 1, . . . , k2 ,
λmp
1−m < λmp
−m < λmp
−k2 = λm/ε < λˆ(k),
which implies the validity of ( 21 ) for λmp
1−m and λmp
−m.
Call an interval [τ ′, τ ′′) ⊂ R correct if V arτ
′′
τ ′ [ln ςµ] dt < M/k.
Let us define a scalar function ς ′ on R≥0 by the following rules: ς
′(t) = 0 for all t ≥ T (µ) ;
ς ′(t) = ςµ(t) for all t ∈ [τm−1, τm) if this interval is correct, and ς
′(t) = λm for t ∈ [τm−1, τm)
if this interval is incorrect.
Note that in this case there are at least k2 − k correct intervals of k2 . Then, the integrals
of the functions ςµ and ς
′ over the incorrect intervals do not exceed kδ < ε by ( 20 ) . Now,
for all z ∈ K , we have ∫ ∞
0
ς ′(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt−
∫ ∞
0
ςµ(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt < 2ε.
In particular,
V
♭[ςµ] > V
♭[ς ′]− 2ε. (22)
Note that ς ′ was introduced such that, for all m = 1, . . . , k2, we have
λm =
∫ τm
τm−1
ς ′(t) dt
τm − τm−1
=
∫ τm
τm−1
ςµ(t) dt
τm − τm−1
=
pm−1 − pm
τm − τm−1
,
λm ≤ sup
t∈[τm−1,τm)
ς ′(t) ≤ eM/k inf
t∈[τm−1,τm)
ς ′(t),∫ τm
τm−1
λmg
(
z(t)
)
dt ≤ eM/k
∫ τm
τm−1
ς ′(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt. (23)
Remember that ̟
|1−p〉
ν = p̟ν/p for all positive ν. Now, for all z ∈ K, the density ̟λmp1−m
satisfies
̟
|1−p〉
λmp1−m
= p̟λmp−m,
q[̟λmp1−m](1− p) =
1− p
λmp1−m
= τm − τm−1,

|1−p〉[̟λmp1−m ](z) =
∫ τm−τm−1
0
λmp
1−mg
(
z(t)
)
dt+ pV ♭
[
̟λmp−m
](
z(τm − τm−1)
)
. (24)
Consider any of m = 1, . . . , k2. By ( 21 ) , pm−1V∗ − κ does not exceed the lower value of
the game with the payoff pm−1|1−p〉[̟λmp1−m], i.e., (see ( 24 ) ), the payoff∫ τm−τm−1
0
λmg
(
z(t)
)
dt+ pmV ♭
[
̟λmp−m
](
z(τm − τm−1)
)
.
Thanks to ( 21 ) and the definition of λm , that does not exceed the value of the game with
the payoff ∫ τm−τm−1
0
λmg
(
z(t)
)
dt+ pmV∗
(
z(τm − τm−1)
)
+ κ.
Then, in the last game, there exists an κ -optimal strategy Am ∈ A , i.e., for all z ∈ Am , the
number pm−1V∗
(
z(0)
)
does not exceed∫ τm−τm−1
0
λmg
(
z(t)
)
dt+ pmV∗
(
z(τm − τm−1)
)
+ 3κ.
Since the right-hand side of these inequalities depends only on z|(0,τm−τm−1), the strategy
Am can be substituted here with any strategy A ∈ A that can be represented in the form
Am ⋄τm−τm−1 A
′′. Now, for all A′, A′′ ∈ A, z ∈ A′ ⋄τm−1 A
2 ⋄τm A
′′ ,
pm−1V∗
(
z(τm−1)
)
≤
∫ τm
τm−1
λmg
(
z(t)
)
dt+ pmV∗
(
z(τm)
)
+ 3κ
(23)
≤ eM/k
∫ τm
τm−1
ς ′(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt+ pmV∗
(
z(τm)
)
+ 3κ. (25)
Set A∗
△
= A1 ⋄τ1 A
2 ⋄τ2 · · · ⋄τk−1 A
k2. For every z ∈ A∗ , ( 25 ) holds for all m = 1, . . . , k2.
Now, taking first m = 1 and accounting for τ0 = 0 , and subsequently applying ( 25 ) for
m = 2, 3 . . . , k2 , we see that
V∗
(
z(0)
) (25)
≤ eM/k
∫ τ1
0
ς ′(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt+ pV∗
(
z(τ1)
)
+ 3κ
(25)
≤ eM/k
∫ τ2
0
ς ′(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt+ p2V∗
(
z(τ2)
)
+ 6κ
. . .
(25)
≤ . . .
(25)
≤ eM/k
∫ τ
k2
0
ς ′(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt + pk
2
V∗
(
z(τk2)
)
+ 3k2κ.
for all z ∈ A∗. Recall that eM/k < 1 + ε. Then, we obtain
V∗
(
z(0)
) (20)
≤ eM/k
∫ τ
k2
0
ς ′(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt+ 2ε
≤ eM/k − 1 +
∫ ∞
0
ς ′(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt+ 2ε
≤
∫ ∞
0
ς ′(t)g
(
z(t)
)
dt+ 3ε ∀z ∈ A∗.
Now,
V∗
(
z(0)
)
≤ V ♭[ς ′]
(
z(0)
)
+ 3ε
for all z ∈ A∗. In view of ( 22 ) , we proved that V∗ ≤ V
♭[ςµ] + 6ε for all sufficiently small
positive µ. 
References
[1] O. Alvarez and M. Bardi, Ergodic problems in differential games, In Advances in dynamic
game theory, Birkha¨user, Boston, (2007), pp. 131–152
[2] M. Arisawa Ergodic problem for the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation II, In Annales
l‘Institut Henri Poincare(C) Non Linear Analysis, 15, (1998) pp. 1–24
[3] Z. Artstein and V. Gaitsgory The value function of singularly perturbed control systems,
Appl. Math. Optim., 41,3 (2000), pp. 425–445
[4] M. Bardi, On differential games with long-time-average cost, In Advances in dynamic games
and their applications, Birkha¨user, Boston, (2009), pp. 3–18
[5] R. Buckdahn, D. Goreac, and M. Quincampoix Existence of asymptotic values for nonex-
pansive stochastic control systems, Appl. Math. Optim., 70,1 (2014), pp. 1–28
[6] P. Cardaliaguet, R. Laraki, and S. Sorin, A Continuous Time Approach for the Asymp-
totic Value in Two-Person Zero-Sum Repeated Games, SIAM J. Cont. Optim., 50 (2012),
pp. 1573–1596
[7] P. Cardaliaguet Ergodicity of Hamilton-Jacobi equations with a non coercive non convex
Hamiltonian in R2/Z2 , In Annales l‘Institut Henri Poincare(C) Non Linear Analysis, 27,3
(2010), pp. 837–856.
[8] V. Gaitsgory and M. Quincampoix On sets of occupational measures generated by a deter-
ministic control system on an infinite time horizon, Nonlinear Anal. 88, (2013), pp. 27–41.
[9] D. V. Khlopin On uniform Tauberian theorems for dynamic games, arXiv preprint
arXiv:1412.7331 (2014)
[10] J. F. Mertens and A. Neyman Stochastic Games, Int. J. of Game Theory 10(1981), pp. 53–
66
[11] D. Monderer and S. Sorin Asymptotic properties in Dynamic Programming, Int. J. of Game
Theory, 22(1993), pp. 1–11.
[12] M. Oliu-Barton, and G. Vigeral A uniform Tauberian theorem in optimal control, In:
Advances in Dynamic Games, Birkha¨user, Boston, 2013, pp. 199–215.
[13] M. Quincampoix and J. Renault On the existence of a limit value in some non expansive
optimal control problems, SIAM J. Control. Optim., 49 (2011), pp. 2118-2132
[14] J. Renault General limit value in Dynamic Programming, arXiv preprint arXiv:1301.0451
(2013)
[15] G. Vigeral A zero-sum stochastic game with compact action sets and no asymptotic value,
Dyn. Games and Appl., 3 (2013), pp. 172–186.
[16] B. Ziliotto A Tauberian theorem for nonexpansive operators and applications to zero-sum
stochastic games, arXiv preprint arXiv:1501.06525 (2015)
